TRANSCRIPT

Q1 2020 — Fixed income call transcript

Q1 2020PDF · 24 pages157 KB
Deutsche Bank AG
Deutsche Bank Q1 2020 Fixed Income Conference Call
Thursday, 30 April 2020 | 15:00 CEST
Transcript
Speakers
James von Moltke, Chief Financial Officer
Dixit Joshi, Group Treasurer
James Rivett, Head of Investor Relations

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James Rivett 	Thank you, Stewart, and good afternoon or good morning and
thank you all for joining us today. On our call as always our CFO,
James von Moltke, will speak first. Then our group treasurer,
Dixit Joshi, will take you through some of the fixed-income-
specific topics. In the room for Q&A we also have Jonathan
Blake, our global head of issuance and securitisation. The slides
to accompany the topic are available for download from our
website at db.com
After the presentation we'll be happy to take your questions but
before we get started I just have to remind you that the
presentation may contain forward-looking statements which
may not develop as we currently expect. Therefore please take
a look at the precautionary warning at the end of our materials.
With that let me hand over to James.
James von Moltke 	Thank you, James, and welcome from me. This is an extremely
challenging and unprecedented time for all of us and none of us
have full visibility on how the situation will develop. But it is in
times like these that our bank can prove its resilience and its
value to society and all our stakeholders. Despite the turbulence
we have continued to execute on our transformation we are very
happy with our performance in the quarter as we outperformed
our 	internal 	expectations 	for 	both 	revenues 	and 	costs,
specifically in the core bank.
We also made solid progress against our strategic priorities. We
are 	benefiting 	from 	our 	conservative 	balance 	sheet
management and this stability is enabling us to support our
clients. With the right strategy and with Germany as our home
market we believe that Deutsche Bank can strengthen its
competitive position in these difficult times.
Slide four shows a summary of our financial performance in the
quarter. Group revenues were flat year on year at €6.4 billion as
growth in the core bank offset the wind-down of the capital
release unit. Non-interest expenses of €5.6 billion included
€503 	million 	of 	bank 	levies 	in 	the 	quarter 	as 	well 	as
approximately €190 million of restructuring and severance,
litigation and transformation charges.
Provisions for credit losses increased to €506 million or the
equivalent of 44 basis points of loans on an annualised basis.
We generated a pre-tax profit of €206 million with profit after
tax of €66 million. Our results in the quarter were impacted both
by our ongoing actions to implement our transformation as well
as the initial impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the most
material of which we discuss on slide five.
In 	the 	first 	quarter 	provisions 	for 	credit 	losses 	included
approximately €260 million of incremental provisions, which we

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will discuss shortly. Our CET1 ratio was negatively impacted by
around 40 basis points from COVID-19 factors. The impact on
our CET1 ratio included a net €400 million of incremental
prudent valuation deductions. These deductions reflect the
increased pricing dispersion and wider spreads given the
market volatility in the latter part of the quarter.
COVID-19-driven increases in risk-weighted assets of €7 billion
included higher credit risk RWA due to ratings migrations and
€5 billion from draw-downs on credit facilities. We would expect
for credit risk RWA to return to more normal levels as clients
replace the drawn facilities with cheaper long-term funding.
The movements in liquidity reserves and risk-weighted assets
were well within the range of stress outcomes that we plan for.
And finally, level three assets increased by €4 billion in the
quarter to €28 billion. The increase was driven by temporary
factors which we expect to normalise over time, as Dixit will
describe later.
Turning to provision for credit losses on slide six, provisions
were €506 million or 44 basis points of loans in the first quarter.
Roughly half of the provisions relate to COVID-19 impact,
principally against stage one and stage two performing loans.
Most of the increase was driven by updates to macroeconomic
variables, changes in credit ratings in segments particularly
impacted by the crisis as well as the higher draw-downs.
We updated our approach this quarter, reflecting the ECB
recommendation to moderate pro-cyclicality. Our forward-
looking indicators now incorporate a three-year averaging of
macroeconomic 	forecasts. 	Our 	forecasts 	are 	based 	on
consensus estimates at the end of March.
Updating the assumptions to the current market views would
have 	increased 	our 	provisions 	for 	credit 	losses 	by
approximately €100 million. Our total stage three provision of
€276 million in the quarter included around €30 million related
to COVID-19. Our stage three provisions increased slightly and
reflect a small number of specific events consistent with our
prior guidance.
Including the provisions taken in the first quarter we ended the
period with €4.9 billion of total allowances for credit losses. This
amount includes €4.3 billion of allowance for loan losses,
equivalent to 95 basis points of loans.
Slide seven shows the progress we have made on revenues in
our core bank. In the corporate bank revenues were flat as we
offset the pressures from the interest rate environment with
loan growth and deposit repricing benefits. We continued to

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actively reprice deposits in the first quarter and are on track to
pass through the negative interest rates to €25 billion of
deposits in 2020 as part of our 2022 targets.
Investment bank revenues grew by 15%, up in both fixed
income and origination and advisory. The first quarter showed
further stabilisation and improvements in market share in our
target market. In the private bank revenues increased by 3%.
This growth was supported by the strong performance in
wealth management, where we continued to benefit from
strategic hiring in prior periods.
We grew loans and volumes to broadly offset the ongoing
interest rate headwinds. In asset management growth in
management fees was offset by interest rate-driven changes in
the fair value of certain guaranteed funds. Despite the market
conditions at the end of the quarter DWS has continued to grow
assets in our core areas, most notably through our strategic
partnerships and ESG funds.
We're determined to not let the current environment disrupt our
cost reduction plans. Excluding transformation charges and
bank levies, adjusted costs declined by 7% year on year to €4.9
billion, as you can see on slide eight. At the end of the first
quarter we have put 73% of our transformation charges behind
us. The progress we have made in the first quarter puts us on a
good path to achieve or outperform against our €19.5 billion
target for 2020.
Slide nine repeats a slide that we have shown you consistently.
We have been managing our balance sheet conservatively and
intend to keep doing so through this period of volatility. With a
12.8% CET1 ratio at quarter end we are comfortably above our
regulatory requirements despite absorbing 30 basis points of
regulatory headwinds at the start of the quarter.
This sound capital position gives us scope to continue to deploy
resources to support clients in these challenging times. As we
disclosed on Sunday, we are dealing with a great deal of
uncertainty around the CET1 ratio path from here. We've
therefore taken the deliberate decision to allow the CET1 ratio
to dip modestly and temporarily below our target of at least
12.5%. We believe that this is the right thing to do for all of our
stakeholders, including our debt and equity investors. Over time
as the temporary factors I referred to earlier normalise we
expect our CET1 ratio to return to the 12.5% level.

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Our loss-absorbing capacity was €18 billion above our most
binding MREL constraint. We are one of the few European
GSIBs that already comply with the fully-loaded requirements.
We kept our strong liquidity position with reserves of €205
billion and an LCR of 133%.
Our results also show that we continued to operate with low risk
levels. We continue to manage our market risk exposure tightly.
Our value at risk on an average basis remains low at €24 million
and we are focused on maintaining strong credit quality.
I'm sure you've seen the rating actions S&P took last week on
multiple European banks, including us, to reflect the potential
impact 	from 	the 	coronavirus. 	We 	appreciate 	that 	S&P
recognises our strong balance sheet. This should be the key
criteria, 	together 	with 	the 	continued 	execution 	of 	our
transformation 	agenda, 	to 	determine 	our 	forward 	ratings
trajectory. We will not deviate from our agenda and will do
everything in our power to maintain our current ratings and
improve them over time.
Before I hand over to Dixit let me conclude with a few remarks
on our role, on how we see us as well-positioned in the current
environment on slide ten. With our refocused strategy we're
now operating in businesses with market-leading positions,
providing industry-leading solutions. Germany is our home
market where we generate approximately 40% of our revenues.
In the corporate bank as the hausbank to nearly one million
small and medium-sized companies in Germany we are well-
positioned to help clients through the crisis. In investment
banking for the first time since 2017 we've regained our position
as the market leader in German corporate finance year to date.
In the private bank and DWS 	we're helping our private
customers to navigate through turbulent conditions. We are the
leading retail bank with 19 million customers and the leading
retail asset manager. We also believe that Germany is relatively
well-positioned 	to 	manage 	through 	the 	macroeconomic
turbulence. The Government has put in place a series of well-
designed programmes which should provide support quickly to
the broader economy.
We are pleased and proud to have contributed to this process
both in the design and implementation of the programmes and
given the strong fiscal position the German Government is well-
positioned to take additional action if required.
The German consumer and corporate sectors are relatively
well-positioned to deal with this crisis. Consumer debt levels are
amongst the lowest in the Eurozone and the developed world.

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German small and large corporate customers are also operating
with the lowest levels of leverage and highest levels of liquidity
in the last 30 years.
We feel fortunate to have Germany as a home market in volatile
times. With that let me hand over to Dixit.
Dixit Joshi 	Thank you, James. Let me start with a review of our net balance
sheet on slide 12. 	This view excludes derivative netting
agreements, cash collateral and pending settlement balances
from our IFRS balance sheet to make it more comparable to US
GAAP accounting standards.
We have transformed our balance sheet significantly over the
last years. This provides a robust foundation as we continue to
execute 	on 	our 	transformation 	and 	manage 	through 	the
challenging macroeconomic environment. On the asset side
around 20% of our net balance sheet is in cash and Government
securities as part of our liquidity reserves.
Roughly half comprises our loan portfolio, which we will discuss
shortly. Trading assets account for roughly a quarter of our
balance sheet. As our low value at risk indicates, this is a
conservatively managed book with tightly controlled risk limits
and includes our secured financing activities with low credit risk
as they are well collateralised.
On the liability side trading liabilities increased over the quarter
and account for less than 20% of our net balance sheet. This
increase largely reflects seasonal variations as well as increases
due to recent volatility and does not reflect any material shift in
our funding profile.
More than 80% of our balance sheet is funded by most stable
sources. Deposits now account for around 60% of our liabilities.
We have worked to improve the quality of our deposit base over
time, which consists mainly of retail and corporate deposits.
Only 2% of the net balance sheet is from unsecured short-term
wholesale funding. Our overall funding base has proven to be
very resilient and now allows us to actively support our clients
in this challenging environment.
Let us now take a closer look at our loan portfolio on slide 13.
Our loan books are well-diversified across the businesses,
customer segments and regions. Around half of our total loan
portfolio is in the private bank, mainly German mortgages with
conservative loan-to-value ratios and low delinquency rates.
In wealth management almost all our loans are secured,
typically 	by 	high-quality 	liquid 	stocks 	and 	bonds 	with

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conservative loan-to-value. 90% of our commitments in the
corporate 	and 	investment 	banks 	are 	to 	clients 	rated
investment-grade and from a regional perspective our loan
books 	are 	also 	well-diversified. 	Approximately 	half 	our
portfolios are in Germany with a further 20% in EMEA and the
US.
The next slide gives you an overview of our exposure towards
focus industries. In commercial real estate our exposure is
predominantly firstly in mortgage lending with an average 60%
loan-to-value. Our portfolio is diversified across a broad range
of high-quality properties, typically in gateway cities.
Our oil and gas exposures are focused on the investment-grade
majors. We have very modest exposure to non-investment-
grade exploration and production segments. In retail we have
contained our exposure to strong global names with very limited
exposure to non-food retailers.
Within 	the 	airline 	spade 	our 	exposures 	are 	secured 	at
conservative 	loan-to-values 	with 	the 	unsecured 	portfolios
biased towards national flag carriers in developed markets. And
finally our leisure portfolio is small and focused on large
hospitality industry leaders with minimal exposure to cruise
ships and tour operators.
In summary, we believe that our loan book portfolio is low-risk
and well-diversified and our risk profile is supported by our
comprehensive stress-testing framework and proactive risk
management.
Slide 15 provides more details around our level three assets,
which stood at €28 billion. Level three assets increased by €4
billion 	in 	the 	quarter. 	The 	increase 	was 	driven 	by 	a
reclassification of some inventory into level three due to the
increased dispersion in market pricing towards the end of the
quarter. This was mainly in relation to derivative transactions,
where the material components of the underlying risk are
typically hedged.
We also saw higher carrying values on existing level three
derivative inventory, mainly driven by movements in interest
rates. 	These 	increases 	were 	largely 	offset 	by 	equivalent
increases in level three liabilities. As conditions normalise some
of the market-related effects should reverse and therefore
reduce the current level of prudential valuation deduction and
level three assets.
That said, developments in the nearer term are difficult to
predict and will depend on market dynamics. Just to reiterate
what we told you previously, a level three classification is not an

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indicator of risk or asset quality but an accounting indicator of
valuation uncertainty due to lack of observability of at least one
significant valuation parameter.
We have several safeguards in place to mitigate the valuation
uncertainty, including prudential valuation adjustments of €700
million 	and 	the 	exchange 	of 	collateral 	with 	derivative
counterparties. In addition our level three assets are revalued
continuously both by our businesses and also through our
independent valuation teams.
Let me now walk you through the development of our liquidity,
capital and issuance metrics, starting with liquidity on slide 17.
We believe that our ability to manage and steer our liquidity
through the quarter is a testament to the investments we have
made in our data, governance and tools in recent years and also
to the stability of our funding base given the reshaping of our
balance sheet. With signs of stress appearing in markets in early
March we implemented heightened governance and increased
the frequency of our reporting, including on our committed
facilities.
In the quarter we deployed €18 billion into supporting our
existing clients' drawings on committed facilities with a further
seven billion of new loans. As a result we ended the quarter with
liquidity reserves of €205 billion and a liquidity coverage ratio of
133%, both above our targets. We remain committed to
providing liquidity to support our clients.
To that end we've earmarked €20 billion of additional lending in
the second quarter including - half of which is funded by KFW.
We are comfortable operating below our targets temporarily but
will prudently maintain buffers above our regulatory thresholds.
As the market environment normalises we would expect to see
our liquidity reserves and liquidity coverage ratio return closer
to current levels.
Moving now to capital on slide 18, our CET1 ratio was 12.8% at
quarter end, down roughly 80 basis points from the prior
quarter. Approximately 30 basis points of the decline came from
the impact of the new securitisation framework we have
discussed with you in previous calls.
In line with our stated strategy we also continued to fund our
business growth across our core businesses, which consumed
roughly ten basis of capital in the quarter. Our CET1 ratio was
impacted by around 40 basis points as a result of COVID-19,
which James described earlier. As noted, we would expect for
the COVID-19 items to sustainably normalise over time as the
macroeconomic situation stabilises and we will maintain ample

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buffers above our regulatory requirements, which we will
discuss on the next slide.
Our CET1 ratio at quarter end was approximately 240 basis
points 	above 	our 	recently 	revised 	regulatory 	capital
requirements. The reduction in our CET1 ratio requirement
reflects the recent ECB decision to implement CRD5 article
104a with immediate effect. This allows us to partially meet the
pillar two capital requirements with AT1 and tier two capital.
In addition several countries have lowered their countercyclical
capital buffers as a reaction to the COVID-19 crisis. These
measures have resulted in a 114 basis point reduction of our
CET1 ratio requirement which now stands at 10.44%. Our most
binding capital requirement is now on the total capital ratio with
a buffer of 155 basis points or the equivalent of €5 billion
headroom in capital terms.
More importantly we now have tier two issuance available as a
tool to improve the distance to our tightest regulatory capital
requirement. Our leverage ratio was 4% at quarter end, as
described on slide 20. The ratio declined 21 basis points in the
quarter.
This 	decline 	was 	principally 	driven 	by 	COVID-19-related
impacts, most notably increased draw-downs on credit lines, as
already discussed in the liquidity section, and higher net
derivatives and trading exposures, and an atypical increase in
pending settlement balances of around €20 billion, which came
on top of the usual seasonal increase in pendings post the year-
end low which we do not include as COVID-19-related.
Other changes in the quarter reflect mostly seasonal balance
sheet increases, including a further rise of approximately 20
billion 	in 	pending 	settlement 	claims 	and 	other 	seasonal
movements in our trading-related balances. These other more
seasonal effects were materially offset by the benefit to our
leverage ratio from our US$1.25 billion AT1 issuance that we
completed in February.
At 4% our reported leverage ratio is well above the requirement
of 3% that is currently scheduled to be introduced by mid next
year. This is despite our ratio being burdened with around 20
basis points of temporary effects from pending settlement
balances, which will reduce to near zero with the introduction of
CRR2 next year and bring us in line with current treatment for
US and Swiss banks.
In addition we have around a ten basis point drag in our ratio
from the prime finance platform being transferred to BNP
Paribas. Our leverage ratio is already above the requirement of

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3.75%, which we so far expected to come into play from the
start of 2022. It is now likely to apply from January 2023
following the European Commission proposal earlier this week
for a change to the regulation.
Excluding central bank cash from leverage exposure - also
consistent 	with 	the 	European's 	proposal 	- 	would, 	if
implemented, increase our leverage ratio by approximately 20
basis points. We continue to operate with a significant loss-
absorbing capacity, well above our requirement, as is shown on
slide 21.
At the end of the first quarter 2020 our loss-absorbing capacity
was €18 billion above the minimum required eligible liabilities or
MREL, our most binding constraint. We have significant buffers
and are among the few European global systemic important
banks or GSIBs that already comply with the fully-loaded MREL
requirements.
Our buffer has reduced with the balance sheet expansion which
includes a seasonal increase in pending settlements and loan
growth. In addition we saw a slight reduction in our eligible
senior non-preferred securities as certain maturities fell below
one year. We continue to operate with a comfortable surplus
above our requirements and have sufficient headroom to
absorb the upcoming regulatory and methodology changes
which will become effective in 2021.
These proposed changes include the switch from the total
liabilities and own funds or TLOF to an RWA-based calculation.
The surplus also gives us flexibility to reduce our issuance plan
for this year, as will be discussed on the next slide. During the
first quarter we issued €5.6 billion, primarily euro and sterling
senior non-preferred issuances in January and a US dollar AT1
issue in February.
The issuance of AT1 was designed to support the call of a
legacy tier one instrument, the US$ 800 million DB Contingent
Capital Trust 2. We now expect to issue €10-15 billion in 2020,
down from our previous 15 to 20 billion assumption. The
reduction is driven by two factors. First, our senior non-
preferred issuance plan is informed by multiple constraints,
including TLAC, MREL and rating considerations.
As our latest outlook has sufficient headroom across all of those
we intend to issue less senior non-preferred than originally
anticipated, whilst reserving a significant surplus over the TLAC
and MREL requirements. Second, we will make use of the
various central bank facilities, including TLTRO3 to raise part of
our funding.

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The majority of our remaining 2020 issuance is likely to come in
senior 	preferred, 	structured 	or 	potentially 	covered 	bond
issuance. This reduced issuance requirement allows us to be
flexible in terms of timing and market conditions. We will
continue to review our issuance needs and consider tier two
issuance to manage our MDA buffer in light of changes to article
104a.
In conclusion on slide 23, the improvements in our technology
allow us to more accurately and effectively manage and allocate
our resources. Our balance sheet is low-risk and funded by
highly stable sources. We have excess liquidity, capital and
MREL above our regulatory requirements and our refocused
strategy, operating in businesses where we're market-leading,
has put us in a strong position to support our clients as they
need it.
We will also continue to look for ways to further improve the
efficiency of our balance sheet and this includes ongoing
progress on our deposit repricing programmes as well as the
optimisation of our liquidity resources. We will also continue to
maintain adequate buffers above all regulatory requirements
under which we operate.
In short, we believe that we are well-positioned to deal with the
current challenging environment. With that let us move to your
questions.
Richard Thomas 	Yes, thank you very much for the call. A couple of questions, two
(Bank of America) 	or three questions from me if I may. Just on the liquidity
reserves, they really are down quite a lot - if you think a year ago
they were at 260 and now they're at 205 so there's been an
awful lot of movement there. Can you be a bit more specific
about where we're heading in terms of the use of this important
liquidity buffer and will we ever return to anything like the high
levels that we've seen in 2019? First question.
Second question; we hear you on lower issuance this year,
potentially even lower now that the ECB's made all these
announcements just this afternoon. Next year is a bumper year
for senior non-preferred redemptions, I should say. There's 18
billion. I know some of that will be running out of the ratios this
year but is it likely that you will have a big year's SNP issuance
either later this year or actually next year?
And then finally what are your thoughts on what you have to do
or not to do to stay investment-grade at senior non-preferred
level? Thanks.

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Dixit Joshi 	Richard, hi and thank you for joining. I'll take those, you know,
in turn. With regard to liquidity reserves and LCR, you know,
you'll recall that we've built up a significant surplus of liquidity
from the end of 2016 onwards. As we've improved our
capabilities, as we've announced the strategic restructuring of
the firm last July and been executing on that restructuring –
that has afforded us the flexibility to actually run with lower
levels of liquidity reserves but still with sufficient surpluses to all
of our minimum criteria.
Whether it is the surplus that we've had on MREL, the
significant surplus that we have on TLAC, surpluses to our own
risk appetite at an internal level or with LCR where we had a €43
billion surplus at the end of the first quarter.
So I think we've been quite deliberate in managing down
excesses and we've done that through continued investment in
our data, our technology, our governance and of course
executing on the restructuring of the firm as well, which has
tilted us to a much more stable funding base.
And all of those in aggregate have helped us in the lead-up into
March of this year. To answer your question on whether we
return to those high levels I'd reiterate that our business-as-
usual targets are in the region of around - an LCR of around
130% and liquidity reserves of around 200 billion.
Given that this represents over 40 billion of excess at these
levels we are comfortably set-up to even absorb a second stress
that is similar to the recent environment that we've had. It is
hard to say of course when this market environment will change
and how long this environment will prevail but we do intend to
work closely with our clients to support them, as Christian
reiterated yesterday.
And throughout that we'll continue executing on our business
strategy as well and if necessary we will operate, on a temporary
basis, below the stated targets but of course always above our
minimum levels.
Regarding your question on issuance for next year, we do not
need to refinance the full 18 billion of senior non-preferred
maturities next year. Partly that's because the 18 billion really
falls out of our MREL calculation during the course of this year.
As an example eight billion already fell out during the first
quarter and the remainder will be derecognised during the
course of this year so that's very much embedded into our
planning into 2021.
And that partially drives the ten to €15 billion revised outlook
we've now given for funding for the year, which includes about

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three to six million of senior non-preferred funding. We do
intend to reduce that surplus through the course of this year. I
would point you to our 2022 maturities of € 8 billion, which I
think would be a better guide for what normalised potential new
issuance is likely to be.
On your third question around ratings, what I would say is that
we're maintaining not only all of our regulatory criteria that we're
managing to but also naturally ratings agency constraints and
have been quite deliberate with our funding plans throughout
to ensure that we've been robust.
You would have also noted the consultation that's out from
Moody's around potential changes to the LGF framework. I
don't really want to pre-empt any outcomes from that but that
does also have the likelihood of some positive benefit for us on
senior non-preferred - but again depends on the final outcome.
James von Moltke 	And what I was going to add: First of all, as you'd expect, we've
had a very engaged and frequent dialogue with the ratings
agencies as we have gone through this crisis and the industry
has gone through this crisis. We intend to maintain that
dialogue.
I think the answer to your question is if we simply execute on
our strategic plan we will deliver on the key element here of our
ratings story, which is moving the company to sustainable
profitability. There is a comfort with our balance sheet, the risk
management and other aspects of the ratings story.
I think beyond that if I were to look for a silver lining in this dark
cloud that we're all sort of living through it's that we hope that
this crisis will give us an opportunity to demonstrate that the
focused 	business 	model, 	the 	conservative 	balance 	sheet
management that we've talked about, the risk management and
risk appetite discipline that we have is pressure-testing the
company and that will give investors as well as rating agencies
some kind of real-world proof of the company's resilience in an
environment like this.
Brajesh Kumar 	Hi, good afternoon all; Brajesh from SocGen. I've got two
(Société Générale) 	questions, please. The first one is on your MDA hurdle. I see that
you have adjusted for P2R composition and for the cyclical
buffer but why would you not use a capital conservation buffer,
why can't you do this? I see that one of your Austrian peers
today has exactly done that but why are you being siloed from
doing that?

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And my second question is on provisions. What's the amount of
the 	provisions 	that 	are 	built 	without 	any 	government
guarantees and how much do you think will be the percentage
from government-guaranteed loans that you are bringing inon
your books? Thank you.
Dixit Joshi 	So, Brajesh, I'll take the first and James will take the second. On
the first question, you know, as you point out, we have taken
into account the countercyclical buffer as well as the changes
that arise from 104a and the ability to use AT1 and tier two to
fill our pillar two requirement.
We've also noted the statements from the ECB that the capital
conservation buffer might be used in the crisis but, you know,
quite frankly at this stage that is not something that we have
factored in or necessarily rely on so we do not see that that the
capital conservation buffer at this stage can be excluded from
MDA.
James von Moltke 	On the government guarantee point, as we said yesterday on
the call, you know, IFRS9 provisioning made only a few
adjustments to the typical kind of granular bottoms-up process,
one of which was that we considered for certain obligors in the
most affected sectors where there was the possibility or
likelihood of government support for those 	obligors 	that
potential government support or the impact of that support in
our ratings adjustments.
I would say it had a modest impact frankly on what the IFRS9
reserve might otherwise have been so not the largest part of the
sensitivities here but it is a factor that we think is appropriate to
understanding the creditworthiness of the obligors in our book
in this environment.
Brajesh Kumar 	Okay, and then what about that question on what percent of
government guaranteed loans do you think you'll end up having.
James von Moltke 	Look, the balances are growing. I think it depends on which
programme. The KFW programmes are divided by segment.
Some of them are essentially grants; some of them are 100%
guaranteed, some of them are 80% KFW and 20% the lending
bank. We think it's relatively considerable in the at least single
digits, potentially in the double-digit billions that we will be
disbursing in these programmes.
And that's part of –our commitment to society to support those
programmes. Those assets end up on our balance sheet, as we
say, with a modest risk to us although they obviously are
leverage exposure for a period of time that's with us and is part
of the increase in the balance sheet so they're essentially

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recorded as loans even though the risk piece of it is more
modest.
James Hyde (PGIM) 	Hi, thanks for doing this call. Yes, I've got two questions. One of
them is page 28 of the report and the paragraph a few pages
after; stressed net liquidity position. What does it mean when
that's gone to negative? I mean, it's a swing of 36 billion minus
which is technically more than the decline in the HQLA so is that
basically now assuming that is greater derivative - greater
postings for downgrades that have to happen, greater degree
of collateral posting? And how am I meant to read this swing to
negative in that ratio? That's the first question.
Secondly, I mean, I don't know if you've had a chance for the
kind of disclosures that we get from UK banks but, I mean, today
I wanted to ask about, in terms of the stage one and two or
scenario ECL provisions. I mean, there's one bank today, Lloyds,
for instance; it says, you know, this is what the stock-op
provisions should be with a 10% probability if we get to a
particularly - or what they say is the worst outlook they...
outcome they're looking for and that, you know, you can add the
provisions that have to be added on for that.
Can we sort of have any indication in terms of your worst
scenario, how much more you have to increase the provisions
by in that scenario? Is there a sort of number we can sort of, you
know, hang our hat on and sort of compare to pre-provision
profit, etc.? That's it.
Dixit Joshi 	James, hi. This is Dixit here. Thank you for joining. As I said in
our remarks that we have been quite pleased with the way our
liquidity, our modelling and our risk management has really
functioned through what was an extraordinary stress period. To
begin with our internal stress measures or SNLP, an eight-week
measure for an extreme stress, it gave us a fairly clear and a
fairly early indication of movements, arguably faster than the
regulatory stress test.
Second, you know, we do think that the test is conservative in
many ways. For example the way liquidity resources in branches
and subsidiaries are treated it essentially means we manage in
normal times with fairly healthy buffers at the parent level.
And as you think about the number important to realise that
with it being an eight-week stress it effectively now captures a
second hypothetical eight-week systemic and idiosyncratic
stress in addition to the one which we have just gone through,
which you see manifesting in our numbers.

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Also the measure, being conservative, does not, give any credit
to future or current additional collateral mobilisation from
central banks, nor does it include resources that are trapped or
held at subsidiaries' and branch level.
I must also say that when looking at the components of the
model our liquidity risk drivers that inform the model all
performed far better than model while committed facilities were
roughly in line. So, all said and done, you know, coming out in a
reasonably good position at the end of the first quarter.
James von Moltke 	And, James - it's James - the ECL sensitivity or expected
current loss sensitivity is sort of an interesting science. I don't
want to go into sort of worst cases. What I can assure you is that
from the very earliest days of the crisis our risk colleagues have
been analysing the portfolio against the scenarios and looking
at downside scenarios and updating that analysis dynamically
through the process.
If I think about the sensitivity of the expected credit loss to some
of the variables, it tends not to be all that sensitive to individual
variables and that's why - as we on yesterday's call talked a little
bit about - our outlook in terms of provisioning.
But to give you an example, if the eurozone GDP were 1% worse
than our forecasts the corporate and sovereign portfolio would
move in ECL terms by about 35 million so these are not huge
numbers.
Now, ECL is a multi-factor variable. There are other portfolios
and so there clearly are sensitivities here but in orders of
magnitude they're quite manageable as we look into the future.
James Hyde 	Great, thanks. Just to understand Dixit's answer. The stressnet
liquidity position; I'm trying to think this through. So if you had,
let's say, a TLTRO tender date that came in this eight-week
period does that mean you can just build up the... that position
could be improved because TLTRO's like three years and that
just makes up for this liquidity?
Or is the use of that collateral for other central bank facilities
already assumed in that calculation?
Dixit Joshi 	No, James, we don't assume reliance on central bank facilities
but of course those are available for use, especially given the
expanded facilities that we've seen. I'd also point out that we
hadn't raised incremental funding to address the negative level
given we're quite comfortable with both our liquidity profile, the
forecasting ability that we had, the commitment facilities, data
improvements, going to intra-day in some cases that we had
and so felt quite comfortable.

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The other point I'd mention is that the point of the internal stress
measure is to allow us to adequately position liquidity reserves
prior to any crisis arising and not really to react in the middle of
a crisis and so that's really what the measure has allowed us to
do. We've prepositioned adequate liquidity on the way in and
over time as clients' behaviour normalises and our balance
sheet normalises we'd expect to restore SNLP back to previous
levels or above risk appetite.
Robert Smalley (UBS) 	Hi, thanks. A lot have already been asked and answered. A few
questions on the asset quality side; in terms of what we saw in
the last quarter, I know you spoke about - in the other call about
a lack of deferrals among German clients but one on the trading
side; should we see any issues with tracking counterparties'
collateral calls or any other kind of restructuring of relationships
there or any structured note covenants breached given the
movement in the market? That's one.
Two, on price of oil; when you were probably looking at this at
first we saw the big decrease in the price of oil. Now we have a
much lower for longer kind of scenario ahead of us. How does
that change how you're looking at your oil and gas exposure?
And then lastly on commercial real estate, could you give us a
little geographic breakdown? Looking at slide 14 and while I'm
assuming German customers come under the mitigations
programmes that you outlined I'm also thinking that a lot of your
commercial real estate is outside of Germany, in the States
potentially. What are tenants saying at this point, are you
restructuring relationships there?
And in the past you've been a big lender to Las Vegas and
Atlantic City, which have suffered a big draw-down in terms of
tourism. Could you address all of that?
Dixit Joshi 	Robert, hi. Sure, I'll do the first two and then James can take the
third. Very important for us when we started seeing some of the
early signals of the stress - and our stress model, as I mentioned
earlier gave us some of that indication and gave us that
indication towards the end of February.
This helped us start prepositioning and taking management
action that would allow us to accommodate some of the draw-
downs that we were seeing or that we expected to see.
Part of our sort of health check on a daily basis is to really watch
exactly what you've been saying, which is margin calls, whether
that's clients posting margin to us, whether it's Deutsche Bank
posting margin to other counterparties, the health of the

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clearing system more widely, together with flows of both
collateral and cash between clients, ourselves, clearers and
custodians.
And, in spite of what was truly record volatility and movement,
which naturally resulted in a higher volume of margin calls as
well as a higher absolute magnitude of margin calls, the health
of the financial system - and including from our perspective -
was actually quite good.
There were hardly any major outages across the system, you
know, in terms of failed settlements, breaks, etc., and that's
something that we monitor fairly closely.
In terms of covenants, structured notes, , commodities is not a
business that we have and we had divested out of a while back.
I'm not aware of any sensitivity we've had through the period, to
really oil in particular related to liquidity.
But in aggregate it is something we monitor along all of the
other margin calls that we have. We're also in close contact with
all of the CCPs and the clearing houses given the, you know, the
significant percentage of the industry exposure that has now
migrated to the CCPs over the years.
And once again, I've seen no sign that would concern us, not
even at the peak in March.
James von Moltke 	And so, Robert, just to build on what Dixit just said about the
margin 	calls, 	we 	were 	very 	pleased, 	gratified 	with 	the
operational 	resilience 	that 	our 	organisation 	showed 	in
managing 	collateral 	calls, 	settlements 	in 	light 	of 	the
circumstances, it was extremely smooth and credit to our
people who manage those processes.
On oil and gas, as we said in our earlier remarks, you know, our
exposures 	there 	are 	quite 	manageable, 	skewed 	to 	the
investment-grade 	and 	majors. 	You 	may 	recall 	that 	we
essentially exited oil and gas in North America a few years ago
and sold those portfolios so our overall exposures there are
much lower than a typical industry sort of portfolio would be at.
Commercial real estate obviously is a significant business for us
and we disclose on page 13 the - or in the slides the exposure.
That is sort of skewed towards major city, high-end commercial
real estate and, as we point out, with relatively low loan-to-
values.
The casino and gaming exposures... we do have some but it is a
much more modest level than it has been in previous years, a
decade ago. I hope that's helpful.

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And just geographically, to give you a sense, the CRE portfolio's
about 60% North America or US and the balance of course rest
of world with a fairly significant portfolio in Europe and
Germany.
Lee Street (Citigroup) 	Hello. Afternoon and thanks for doing the call. I hope you're all
well. Three questions from me, please. Firstly, just on the
focused industries that you highlight on slide 14, I think that's
just - that's for your loan book. Are there sort of, you know,
quantifiable exposures outside the loan book that you can give
us any note just to give us a context for those, you know,
whether it's in the investment bank or trading books, etc.?
Secondly, on stage two loans there was a sort of decent up-tick
in those in the quarter. Any comments on what drove the
increase and just why the level of provisioning that attached to
that increase in stage two didn't seem to match the level of
increase in the actual stage two loans?
And just finally, does the sort of current period of market
weakness, does that impact on, you know, or harm your ability
to achieve your, I guess, deleveraging calls for the non-core
unit? They'd be my three questions. Thank you.
James von Moltke 	Sure. Hi, Lee. Thanks for joining us. So in terms of other
exposures that are of a credit nature, of course in the derivative
books 	counterparty 	credit 	is 	a 	feature, 	something 	that's
managed and hedged and we feel very comfortable with.
In the trading books we obviously have a large credit trading
business. Those are fair-value books and so go through rigorous
price controls and monthly, quarterly valuation processes
including with our auditors and so, changes in those valuations
are essentially recognised up-front.
So I think those are the areas of significant additional credit
exposure that's on our balance sheet. On the stage two, there
obviously is a migration of stage one to stage two that takes
place based on stage two triggers and associated reserving.
There's also a migration into stage three of elements of those
reserve balances.
It's sort of a feature of IFRS9 that the removal of obligors from
stage two into stage three, changes the reserving and there's
not a one-to-one relationship between the stage two reserves
and the stage three reserves in that flow so you can see some
changes, ebbs and flows between those balances over time.
On the deleveraging, we obviously are looking at the market
environment very carefully and working with - through the CRU

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- with both counterparties and clients to continue on our path
and not be disrupted in that deleveraging. We're actually quite
comfortable that the market environment - at least based on
what we're seeing today - won't disrupt that path.
There was obviously a pause in March as people sort of
adjusted to work-from-home and the changed circumstances
but we have resumed auctions, we've resumed our engagement
with 	counterparties 	and 	actually 	the 	pause 	gave 	us 	an
opportunity to catch up on some of the operational processes
around novation and what have you and so there's continued
progress 	then 	on 	the 	deleveraging 	that 	comes 	between
transactions or bargains that are agreed and the balance sheet
recognition in the derivative book of the deleveraging.
So a lot of work underway. Our planning was sort of skewed to
the second half and if we think in some respects the market can
offer some opportunities in a derivatives book to accelerate, not
only to slow down deleveraging.
Jakub Lichwa (RBC) 	Hi, there; a few questions from me. One is on market risk. I
noticed that you took a benefit of the ECB release so without
quantifying what the impact has been can we get assurance
that the back-testing exceptions will be essentially ignored and
pretending they never happened and will never have to make it
back to the model, even once the temporary period is finished?
And also can you give us some comfort that, you know, you are
using this time to reduce your market risk at the same time as
opposed to, you know, making the most of this period when
you're using the old model and running with higher number of
exceptions on a daily basis? So that's number one.
Number two will be on costs. I appreciate you're doing a great
job actually reducing the costs but if we took the situation a bit
to extremes would you... I mean, obviously you - given the
nature of the business that you have there is some variable
compensation there. Is there some slack there, is there some
flexibility that you have in your mind where you could actually
reduce the cost, increase the pre-provision profit without
impairing the franchise significantly? And I mean by that
reducing it in a relatively quick way.
And finally on stage three loan, I mean, it sounds curious and
thinking whether you can give us any comfort in, well, in any way
where the loans would have been or where the provisions would
have been had there not been any government measures; so
that's one.

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Or maybe to ask differently- say you have a client which is facing
problems, it's an existing client. Obviously you have now a
client, you have access to a KfW line. Can you actually go and
refinance the existing lines with the KfW loan and effectively
transfer the credit risk onto KfW? Thank you.
James von Moltke 	So let me try to tackle this quickly. So, as we said yesterday, the
change in the ECB treatment of the multiplier offset the impact
of our outliers and why is that? Well, the former may be
temporary. Obviously it's for the ECB to judge whether that
becomes permanent or whether it outlasts the period of time
over which the outliers would create, if you like, inflation in our
multiplier.
I would also add that we are in the process of updating our
models and framework and there may be changes then to the
market risk RWA that go with that, if you like, upgrade of our
capabilities there so other movements. And there's also the
averaging, so one would expect market risk RWA to increase in
Q2, reflecting the averaging impact which is a 60-day impact
and the March volatility, the April volatility feeding more fully
into the RWA number.
On costs, as you'd expect, we are looking at all levers to manage
our cost base in a way that helps us to offset the likely impact of
this COVID environment both on revenues and loan loss
provisions. Work has been underway on that for several weeks
and management is committed to do everything in our power to
offset the pressure on the P&L coming from this environment
and therefore protect capital.
As it relates to stage three, I guess a couple things; the KfW
programme; there is a credit process that has to be entered into
by the extending bank so it isn't, you know, without a credit
assessment and naturally with the 20% that we hold as an
incentive to make sure we make good credit decisions.
There's also an expectation that the corporates would use not
just those facilities to manage their liquidity; would also use
existing bank facilities or other capabilities. Ultimately, you
know, if borrowers get into difficulties, you know, the outcomes
would be similar in terms of work-out of troubled loan exposures
that we do in the ordinary course.
So we work with obligors in the ordinary course of these
processes and we would expect to do that in this instance as
well. I hope that helps with your questions, Jakub.

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Tom Jenkins (Jefferies) 	Hi, thank you very much. Most of my questions have been
answered, certainly all the technical ones. Just if I may, could I
ask for a little progress report on the PFK merger, where you're
at, what our timing expectancy should be on that and, I suppose,
also what it means for debt issued out of the old PFK or
Deutsche Postbank?
Dixit Joshi 	Tom, hi. Yes, sure. The merger remains on track for May. From
a debt perspective, as would occur in a merger like this,
issuances that are currently obligations of PFK whether that's
senior preferred, preferred depositors or any other obligations
that the PFK entity has would become obligations of DB AG and
those would rank pari-passu with the respective elements of the
creditor hierarchy in DB AG.
So we see that as quite a smooth process into May.
Tom Jenkins 	Okay, so there's no confusion or contention around old PFK
bonds, especially the deeply subordinated ones, causing an
issue in terms of there being Delaware law and complications
around that, you know, a transfer of obligor being a material
fact.
Dixit Joshi 	It's not something that's hit our radar and certainly not our
expectation that the transfer of obligations will not occur quite
smoothly.
Daniel David 	Hi, thanks for taking my questions. Just a couple of quick ones.
(Autonomous) 	Can you just comment on your tier two issuance plans given
you've got a transitional shortfall and appear to be taking the full
benefit of the pillar two 104a dilution?
And then secondly just to touch on LCR again, can you give us
any colour on what LCR looks like in dollars and euros, not just
the high-level number? Thanks.
Dixit Joshi 	Daniel, hi. On tier two, you know, as you point out we have now
the flexibility to issue tier two to the extent that we'd like to fill
our pillar two requirements with either tier one or tier two.
I wouldn't say there's a transitional shortfall. I mean, with a 240
basis point buffer at a CET1 level and a 155 basis point buffer
at the total capital level that does leave us fairly well-positioned
with where we are today.
That said we do have the flexibility now to consider tier-two
issuance and naturally, as you'd expect, that's something that
we will be discussing and considering through time.
From 	an 	LCR 	perspective, 	you 	know, 	our 	most 	binding
constraint on LCR is really LCR at a group level on an all-
currency consolidated basis The currency comparisons become

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fairly tricky especially given that one has the ability to switch
whether directly through the cross-currency market from one
currency into another or, you know, tapping central bank
facilities, for example the ECB dollar facility, which would also
be able to boost, you know, one currency, you know, over
another.
So we do manage our liquidity internally by currency and we
have a number of internal risk metrics and risk appetite levels
by currency and we do maintain a robust profile in all of the
major currencies but from an LCR perspective don't necessarily
break that down externally. I hope that's helpful.
Operator 	There are no further questions at this time and I would like to
hand back to James Rivett for closing comments. Please go
ahead.
James Rivett 	Thank you, Stewart, and thank you, everyone, for joining us
today. The events relations team is available for your follow-up
questions. Just reach out. Otherwise stay healthy.
Disclaimer
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This transcript also contains non-IFRS financial measures. For a reconciliation to directly
comparable figures reported under IFRS, to the extent such reconciliation is not provided in

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this transcript, refer to the Q1 2020 Financial Data Supplement, which is available at
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